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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

established his negligence as a cause of the accident. Special term,
relying on Glaser, held that D-1's cause of action was not barred
by the prior adjudication. The appellate division reversed, holding
that
the Glaser case should no longer be blindly followed as a controlling
precedent. Recent decisions in the Court of Appeals give clear indication that Glaser may not be accepted as an authority under the present
day application of the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.10 5
It was found that the prior action included a determination of
whether or not D-1 caused or contributed to the collision, and that
implicit in the jury's verdict was a finding that D-1 was negligent.
Under these circumstances, the court felt that the defensive application of collateral estoppel was fair and just.
Where the issues involved in an action were previously fully
litigated, and the parties are the same, there is no reason to relitigate those issues. In light of recent Court of Appeals activity
in the field of collateral estoppel, the holding in Schwartz is not
surprising.
Collateral Estoppel: Glaser doctrine retained in second department.
The rule of Glaserv. Huette '10 will continue to be applied in the
second department. In a recent case, Higginbothom v. Rath,07 D-1
and D-2 (owner and operator of car 1) were awarded a verdict for
property damage and personal injuries against D-3 and D-4 (owner
and operator of car 2), in a prior action. In the instant action,
plaintiff (passenger in car 1) sued all four defendants for personal
injuries. D-1 and D-2 moved for leave to serve an amended
answer setting up the affirmative defense of res judicata, on the
ground that, in the prior action, the issue of negligence on the part
of the drivers had been decided. The motion was granted, but the
merits of the defense were left for adjudication in the trial court.
Subsequently, D-3 and D-4 moved to strike out the affirmative
defense, but special term denied the motion on the ground that
movants had no standing to question the sufficiency of a defense in
their co-defendants' answer addressed to the complaint.
As stated by the appellate division, here, the general rule in
cases involving joint tortfeasors is that, prior to judgment and
prior to the time when the issue of contribution becomes directly
relevant, one defendant is not aggrieved by a determination in favor
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of a co-defendant against the plaintiff.10s However, it was held that
D-3 and D-4 were aggrieved parties and did have standing to question the merits of the affirmative defense because:
1.
2.

A holding that the defense is valid, as a matter of law, would
mean that D-i and D-2 were free from negligence, and, therefore, D-3 and D-4 alone were negligent.
Such a holding might be detrimental to plaintiff, depending on
his injuries, the financial standing of D-3 and D-4, and the
extent of their insurance coverage. Thus, the motion to strike
out the defense was granted.

As additional authority, the court cited the holdings in Glaser
and Bartalone v. Niagara Car & Truck Rentals, Inc.,10 9 for the
proposition that res judicata is not a valid defense. Thus, a conflict has developed with the first department's recent holding that
Glaser no longer has any precedential value and can no longer be
followed. 110
Collateral Estoppel: DeWitt principle held inapplicable in driverpassenger situation.
In B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall,"" the Court of Appeals posited
two requirements for the offensive utilization of collateral estoppel.
First, it must be unquestioned that the initial action has been
vigorously defended and second, the later cause of action must be
derivative of the first."'
While the derivative relationship necessary for use of the
doctrine was not defined by the Court, the editors of the Survey
have assumed that the owner-operator relationship was intended. n"
10s See generally 7 WEINsmN, Kom & Miuzm, Nav YoRx CiVil. PRAc-

%5511.08 (1966).
109 29 App. Div. 2d 689, 288 N.Y.S.2d 312 (2d Dep't 1968). For a further discussion of this case, see The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice,
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43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 302, 334 (1968).
110 Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 30 App. Div. 2d 193, 291 N.Y.S.2d

151 (1st Dep't 1968).
111 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
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DeWitt holding, its requirements, and its effect on litigation is
discussed in The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 128, 150 (1967); 43 ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv. 436, 463 (1968); 43 ST.
JOHN'S L REv. 302, 336 (1968). See also 5 WmNsmn= , KoRN & MI.LR,
NEw YoRK Civn. PRAc'ncE 5011.27 (1967).
113 Case law, however, manifests a conflict as to what relationship is
requisite to a "derivative" action. Compare Cobbs v. Thomas, 55 Misc. 2d
800, 286 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1968) (discussed in
The Quarterly Survey of New York*Practice, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 302,
336-38 (1968)) with, Quick v. O'Connell, 53 Misc. 2d 1091, 281 N.Y.S.2d 120
(Sup. Ct. Jefferson County 1967). (Criticized in The Qucarterly Survey of
New York Practice, 42 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 436, 463-64 (1968)).

